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47 
REACTION 
A MARRIAGE IS A MARRIAGE IS A MARRIAGE: 
THE LIMITS OF PERRY V. BROWN 
Robin West 
“That which we call a rose, 
By any other name would smell as sweet.” 
William Shakespeare 
 
“A rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.” 
Gertrude Stein 
 
“A South politician preaches to the poor white man 
‘You got more than the blacks, don’t complain. 
You’re better than them, you been born with white skin,’ 
they explain.” 
Bob Dylan 
 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perry v. Brown, authored by Judge 
Reinhardt, has been widely lauded in the last few weeks by marriage 
equality proponents for its creative minimalism.  In keeping with 
commentators’ expectations, the court found a way to determine that 
California’s Proposition 8 violated the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Pro-
tection Clause, namely that the provision took away an entitlement 
that had previously been enjoyed by same-sex couples — the right to 
the appellation of one’s partnership as a “marriage” — for no rational 
reason.  The People of California’s categorization and differential 
treatment of same-sex couples as compared with opposite-sex couples, 
the court held, failed the test of minimal rationality required for 
upholding state action.  The two types of couples were simply too in-
distinguishable to carry the weight of the difference between them that 
the People of California had tried to codify.  Thus, the court struck 
down the state constitutional amendment. 
The court did so, however, by relying heavily on facts peculiar to 
California’s political history, thereby limiting the case’s disruption of 
democratic processes in both California and elsewhere, and, not inci-
dentally, minimizing the size of the target the case presents should the 
presumptively hostile Supreme Court review the decision.  First, Prop-
osition 8 removed an entitlement that had been granted by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court just a few years earlier.  The case thus arose in a 
posture not shared by other cases involving same-sex marriage: what 
was at stake was the constitutionality of a referendum that took 
away — rather than failed to grant — same-sex marriage.  Second, 
California, by statute, guarantees to same-sex couples a “domestic 
partnership” which statutorily grants all of the legal incidents of mar-
riage, including rights of parentage and adoption.  Because of the first 
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fact — that what the Court was faced with was the withdrawal of a 
preexisting right — the Court did not have to reach the question of 
whether same-sex couples possess a “right to marry” where it has never 
before been recognized.  Because of the second fact — that all that 
was at stake in California was the appellation “marriage” since the 
domestic partnership laws guaranteed to same-sex couples all other in-
cidents of marital status — there was no need for the Court to decide 
whether there would be a “rational basis” for a state to refuse to grant 
the right to marry to same-sex couples on the basis of the purported 
superiority of child-raising in families headed by opposite-sex partners: 
the case simply does not raise these questions, since California’s statu-
tory scheme grants equal family status to both sorts of couples, and 
Proposition 8 did not upset that.  The court did not, therefore, have to 
decide that there exists a “fundamental right to marry,” or that any re-
striction on the rights of gay people to marry would violate fundamen-
tal constitutional values.  Rather, it narrowly held that Proposition 8, 
which stripped gay citizens only of the appellation “married” and left 
all other incidents of marriage intact, worked a dignitary and psychic 
harm on gay and lesbian partners, and did so for no defensible reason.  
This decision is thus of no relevance to cases challenging a state’s re-
fusal to extend marriage to include gays and lesbians, and it is of no 
relevance to cases challenging a state’s withdrawal of such a right if 
that right is also accompanied by a denial of concrete benefits and ac-
companied by some explanation — such as the superiority of hetero-
sexual parenting — for the decision to do so.  Perry v. Brown is noth-
ing more than a sui generis decision for a unique set of facts.  Thus, 
creative minimalism. 
There is, however, a less flattering sense in which the case is mini-
malist: the opinion perfectly exemplifies the “truncated” nature of judi-
cial — and hence legal — liberal thought, as first described by critical 
legal scholars thirty years ago.  Truncated reasoning, Roberto Unger 
and others then explained, is a form of pseudo-critical thought that 
proceeds from premises to a conclusion by focusing myopically on a 
handful of legally relevant facts, declaring x like y, finding the matter 
settled, and leaving out of consideration altogether whatever social, 
cultural, historical, linguistic, legal, and even constitutional dimensions 
of x rendered it of interest in the first place. 
Perry v. Brown is a perfect example.  The case turns on the injury 
sustained by virtue of the loss of the right to call oneself “married” ra-
ther than “domestically partnered” and to be perceived as such.  
Whether this is or is not an injury, then, depends crucially on the 
meaning of “marriage.”  The court in effect holds that a rose is a rose 
is a rose — a rose is not a stem, petals and a bunch of thorns, but ra-
ther, a rose is a “rose,” and likewise, a “marriage” is not a “domestic 
partnership” with benefits attached, but rather, a “marriage” is a mar-
riage is a marriage.  A domestic partnership just does not smell as 
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sweet.  Marriage is an institution within which partners publicly 
commit their hearts and futures to each other, come good or ill fortune.  
Domestic partnership, whatever it is, is not that.  Thus, one who loses 
the entitlement to the appellation suffers an injury.  What this senti-
mental definition leaves out, or truncates, I suggest, are political, so-
cial, moral, and even constitutional meanings of marriage, all of which 
might have hugely complicated the triumphal arc of the decision.  The 
question I will ask at the end is whether the flame of “marriage equali-
ty” wrought by the decision is worth the candle of the critical under-
standing of marriage that is jettisoned in order to achieve it. 
What are those meanings?  Let us start with the political.  To subs-
tantiate his definition of marriage, Judge Reinhardt quotes Shakes-
peare, various comedic routines, and a Marilyn Monroe movie title.  
He does not reference other markers of the meaning of marriage: for 
example, the marital rape exemptions in force in all states until the 
1980s, which legalized and legitimated forced sex between “husbands” 
and “wives,” or the definitions of the crime of abortion, up until Roe, 
which, combined with those exemptions, effectively criminalized abor-
tions of pregnancies that resulted from rape by husbands.  He does not 
reference the constructed definition of marriage that emerges from the 
Personal Work and Responsibility Acts from the 1990s and 2000s, 
which sought explicitly to encourage marriage among poor people by 
drastically reducing welfare benefits for single women with children — 
and which thus predicated the right and practice of parenting in po-
verty upon achievement of the status of marriage.  He does not refer-
ence the legitimacy statutes that until the mid-twentieth century de-
prived “illegitimate” children of various rights of inheritances, or 
contemporary Second Amendment jurisprudence in which the familial 
home is a castle within which guns might be kept and used against in-
truders with impunity, and so forth.  The result is simply a skewed ac-
count of both “marriage” and the “right to marry.”  However hotly it 
may now be desired, marriage is also an institution with several centu-
ries’ worth of history, the point of which has historically been to do-
mesticate women’s childbearing labor, subject wives’ sexuality to the 
command of their husbands, channel male sexuality into familial 
forms, and provide a semi-privatized social welfare safety net to those 
who form traditional families, but not to those who remain unattached 
or who form non-traditional families.  There is no mention of any of 
this in Perry v. Brown. 
Second, let us consider social meanings.  Perry turns crucially on 
the irrelevance of one of California’s purported reasons for removing 
the honorarium of “marriage” from same-sex domestic partnerships — 
what has come to be called the “responsible procreation” rationale.  
Extending marriage to same-sex couples, opponents say, would dilute 
the social “meaning” of marriage as the responsible locale for procrea-
tive sex.  Opposite-sex sex leads to births, and births outside of mar-
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riage are bad for both the babies and the taxpayers that must support 
them.  Therefore, opponents of same-sex marriage argue, society prop-
erly channels that opposite-sex sex into marriage, partly by sentimenta-
lizing and glamorizing the institution.  The state is thereby relieved of 
the need to serve as a provider for children, who are raised and sup-
ported by those to whom they are genetically linked, and of the need 
to protect or discipline wives, who are rendered economically depen-
dent upon their children’s fathers.  All of this is in children’s best in-
terest, so extending the marital franchise to those for whom the mes-
sage is unneeded or irrelevant muddles the social meaning of marriage, 
resulting in suboptimal child-raising.  The Perry court found it unne-
cessary to explore this argument as well as its predicate — that hetero-
sexual marriage is a responsible venue for parenting — because the 
State of California already extends to same-sex couples all incidents of 
traditional marriage, including parental rights.  Thus, the discussion of 
the People’s reason for their initiative was literally truncated. 
This truncation is unfortunate.  The responsible procreation argu-
ment importantly rests on an outdated premise, which could be, and 
should be, explored.  Obviously, it is not the existence of same-sex 
couples who wish to marry that muffled the social, and disciplining, 
meaning of marriage — that marriage just is what you do first, if you 
want to have the kind of sex that leads to pregnancies.  What muffled 
that message, and hence the meaning of marriage was, in short, birth 
control.  Heterosexual sex does not lead to irresponsible procreation so 
long as it is contracepted.  One way, then, to ensure that heterosexual 
sex is procreatively responsible is not to require marriage as a precur-
sor, but — more simply and more pleasurably — to insist upon the re-
sponsible use of birth control.  While the birth control revolution took 
place in the 1960s, the same-sex marriage revolution was not in public 
view until the 1990s, and by then, the social meaning of marriage as 
the venue within which procreative sex — meaning heterosexual 
sex — could be enjoyed responsibly, had already begun to sound 
quaint.  But it was birth control, not same-sex marriage, that caused 
the shift: sex, post–birth control, is not by definition procreative and 
responsible when it is within marriage, or by definition irresponsible 
when outside of marriage.  Rather, sex both inside and outside mar-
riage is responsible if it is desired and willed by both partners (and 
therefore not rape or harassment) and if it is contracepted, if no child 
is desired.  It is irresponsible if it is not desired and consented to by 
both or all partners or not contracepted, if a child is not desired.  The 
opinion truncates any discussion of this issue with the glib pro-
nouncement that the “responsible procreation” argument is irrelevant, 
because the state had already granted same-sex partners parenting 
rights.  Sure, it is irrelevant — but not because of any statutory 
scheme granting same-sex partners rights to parent or other incidents 
of marriage.  It is irrelevant because the social control it mandates — 
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use marriage to cabin otherwise irresponsible procreative sex — is no 
longer necessary, if it ever was, and even from the sovereign’s perspec-
tive. 
Third, let us consider the moral meaning of marriage.  The opinion 
explicitly truncates its discussion of what it finds to be the true moti-
vation of the People of California: animus toward gay and lesbian 
couples seeking to marry.  But it is not clear why the court is so con-
vinced of this, and why the declaration ends rather than begins the 
discussion.  Why is not it at least possible that the People’s motivation 
is a mix of moral, physical, and emotional cues?  And why should leg-
islation not be based on that mix?  And where does that animus come 
from? 
In addressing the latter question, surely the “animus” felt by the 
People of California toward same-sex couples seeking to marry is at 
least in part based on a moral revulsion against the idea that nonpro-
creative sex could be or should become marriage’s central moral point.  
Is it so surprising that a fundamental metamorphosis in marriage’s 
moral meaning — from the institution legitimating the sex that creates 
children to the institution legitimating the nonprocreative sex that 
creates or strengthens affective bonds — is felt as “animus” toward the 
couples who so personally exemplify this shift?  That an emotion is felt 
as animus does not mean it cannot be based or felt alongside a moral 
sentiment; we feel animus toward those who shoot school children at 
point-blank range, in part because we are revolted by their depravity.  
We can, and do, legislate on the basis of those sentiments, even when 
they are accompanied by “animus.”  Why not here? 
The short answer to that question is simply that the logic of the 
brand of liberalism that underlies mainstream constitutional thinking 
precludes discussion of the morality of victimless conduct, and has for 
several decades now.  Non-neutral moralistic political decisions, 
whether by the legislative or judicial branch, are suspect, so we simply 
disallow them rather than explore their origins.  Again, this truncation 
is unfortunate, and particularly so here.  One consequence, among oth-
ers, of the demand of neutrality underlying gay rights advocacy is that 
the straightforward moral argument that affective sex — sex which, 
unlike commercial or casual sex, underscores and strengthens affective 
bonds between persons of long-standing commitment — is good, and 
that people who engage in it within such relations are engaging in mo-
rally good conduct, simply cannot be uttered by those who are the 
proponents of the broadened marital franchise.  This viewpoint is just 
too non-neutral.  The result of this truncation at the heart of the ar-
gument for same-sex marriage is an argument that is formalistic in the 
extreme: same-sex couples are like opposite-sex couples with respect to 
parenting rights and responsibilities, so they must be treated similarly 
with respect to marriage, without the need for us to pause and ponder 
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the transformations of either the moral point of marriage or the social 
point of sex in the movement from premise to conclusion. 
Finally, the decision truncates even the constitutional meaning of 
marriage that is its purported subject.  Predictably, the court criticizes 
the rationality of drawing lines around opposite-sex couples to the ex-
clusion of same-sex couples — the latter are too much like the former 
to be justifiably treated differently with respect to either the appella-
tion or the incidents of marital status.  Perry, though, neither questions 
nor addresses the irrationality that this partial redrawing accomplish-
es.  Why are we drawing lines around couples brought together by af-
fective sexuality for the purposes of designating a socially superior 
form of adult life?  What has sex got to do with it?  Why do we not al-
low couples to declare themselves married based on friendship alone, 
so that they too might enjoy high social regard and access to preferen-
tial treatment from the social security system or various insurance 
plans?  What about the grandmother helping her daughter to raise a 
grandchild, or the siblings living together to provide better care for a 
parent?  Why is affective sexuality the heart of marriage, rather than 
simply affection, or genetic family ties?  But why, if our concern is 
with the rationality of either the safety net that attaches by virtue of 
marital status or high social esteem, are we drawing lines around 
couples?  Why do we not allow single people to declare themselves 
married, or groups affectively connected — or, for that matter, drawn 
randomly from a population?  Does not everyone potentially need the 
benefit of someone else’s health insurance, and the security that some-
one will serve as their executor should they die, or visit them in a hos-
pital should they become ill?  Why not assign buddies to all of us, as 
we enter adulthood?  The Constitution demands rationality in legisla-
tion, but the demand is so easily met that the demand of rationality 
perversely truncates, rather than furthers, critical thought. 
All of this truncation is unfortunate.  Perry v. Brown ultimately 
does not advance our understanding of the political, social, moral, or 
even constitutional meanings of marriage or sex, and in fact it confuses 
both.  But was the flame worth the candle?  All that truncated social 
thought was, after all, put to an unequivocally good end: the legalist 
and liberal values deployed in Perry, however much they truncate and 
confuse social understanding, highlight perfectly the very real possibili-
ty that Proposition 8 is doing nothing but playing the role in our con-
temporary democracy of the “South politician” in Bob Dylan’s eulogis-
tic tribute to Medgar Evars.  “You got more than [them], don’t 
complain” is, at the end of the day, Proposition 8’s core message: you 
are better because you were born with opposite-sex orientation, and 
you are therefore properly marriageable and in line for the concrete in-
cidents of marriage as well as the attendant elevated social status.  So 
do not complain.  Perhaps that message is the meaning of the “animus” 
the Court references, and which it refuses to credit as a legitimate ba-
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sis for an exercise of sovereign power.  If so, we are well rid of it.  It 
would have been all the better, though, if the Court and the lawyers 
who forced its hand had left the People alone to reach that decision 
themselves. 
 
